	Page 1
1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	Case No. 18-23538-rdd
4	x
5	In the Matter of:
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7	SEARS HOLDINGS CORPORATION,
8	Debtor.
9	x
10	Adv. Case No. 20-07007-rdd
11	x
12	SEARS HOLDINGS CORPORATION et al.,
13	Plaintiffs,
14	v.
15	TISCH et al.,
16	Defendants.
17	x
18	Adv. Case No. 19-08250-rdd
19	x
20	SEARS HOLDINGS CORPORATION et al.,
21	Plaintiffs,
22	v.
23	LAMPERT et al.,
24	Defendants.
25	x

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	Page 2
1	United States Bankruptcy Court
2	300 Quarropas Street, Room 248
3	White Plains, NY 10601
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5	February 23, 2021
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21	BEFORE:
22	HON ROBERT D. DRAIN
23	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
24	
25	ECRO: JUSTIN WALKER

Page 3 1 HEARING re Notice of Agenda of Matters Scheduled for 2 Telephonic Hearing on February 23, 2021 at 10:00 a.m. 3 HEARING re Notice of Hearing on Interim Applications for 4 5 Allowance of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses on 6 February 23, 202 l at 10:00 a.m. (related 7 document(s)9179, 9191, 9181, 9185, 9180, 9183, 9182) 8 9 HEARING re Sixth Application of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 10 as Attorneys for the Debtors, for Interim Allowance of 11 Compensation for Professional Services Rendered and 12 Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary Expenses Incurred Period: 7/1/2020 to 10/31/2020, fee:\$2,006,207.00, expenses: 13 14 \$153,835.61. filed by Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. 15 (ECF #9183) 16 17 HEARING re Fourth Interim Fee Application of Prime Clerk, 18 Administrative Advisor to the Debtors, for Compensation for 19 Services and Reimbursement of Expenses for the Period from 20 July 1, 2020 through October 31, 2020 Filed by Adam M. Adler 21 on behalf of Prime Clerk LLC. (ECF #9185) 22 23 24 25

Page 4 1 HEARING re Sixth Interim Fee Application of Akin Gump 2 Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP as Counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Allowance of 3 Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of 4 5 Expenses for the Period: 7/1/2020 to 10/31/2020, fee: 6 \$3,684,378.50, expenses: \$4,083,695.70. filed by Akin Gump 7 Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. (ECF #9180) 8 9 HEARING re Sixth Interim Application of FTI Consulting, 10 Inc., Financial Advisor to the Official Committee of 11 Unsecured Creditors of Sears Holdings Corporation, et al., 12 for Interim Allowance of Compensation and Reimbursement of 13 Expenses for the Period: 7/1/2020 to 10/31/2020, fee: 14 \$37,480.50, expenses: \$140.00. filed by FTI Consulting, Inc. 15 (ECF #9181) 16 17 HEARING re Third Interim Fee Application of Herrick, Feinstein LLP as Special Conflicts Counsel to the Official 18 Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Allowance of 19 20 Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of 21 Expenses for the Period of July I, 2020 Through and 22 Including October 31, 2020 filed by Herrick, Feinstein LLP. 23 (ECF #9179) 24 25

Page 5 1 HEARING re Second Application for Interim Professional 2 Compensation OF MORITT HOCK & HAMROFF LLP AS SPECIAL CONFLICTS COUNSEL TO THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED 3 4 CREDITORS FOR ALLOWANCE OF COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES 5 RENDERED AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES, Period: 7/1/2020 to 6 10/3 l /2020, fee:\$273,3 71.00, expenses: \$3,566.21 filed by 7 James P Chou. (ECF #9182) 8 9 HEARING re Fifth Joint Application of Paul E. Harner, as Fee 10 Examiner and Ballard Spahr LLP, as Counsel to the Fee 11 Examiner for Interim Allowance of Compensation for Professional Services Rendered and Reimbursement of Actual 12 13 and Necessary Expenses Incurred Period: 7/1/2020 to 10/31/2020, fee:\$348,947.00, expenses: \$324.94. (ECF #9191) 14 15 16 HEARING re Adversary proceeding: 20-07007-rdd Sears Holdings 17 Corporation et al v. Tisch et al Motion to Consolidate for Trial /NOTICE OF MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE RELATED ADVERSARY 18 19 PROCEEDINGS AND ENTER AN AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER (ECF #76) 20 21 22 23 24 25

Page 6 1 HEARING re Adversary proceeding: 20-07007-rdd Sears Holdings 2 Corporation et al v. Tisch et al Objection to Motion Objection of Defendant HSBC Bank Bermuda Limited to 3 Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate Related Adversary 4 5 Proceedings and Enter an Amended Scheduling Order (related 6 document(s)76) filed by Nickolas Karavolas on behalf of Bank 7 of Bermuda (ECF #79) 8 9 HEARING re Adversary proceeding: 20-07007-rdd Sears Holdings 10 Corporation et al v. Tisch et al Objection to Motion I 11 Limited Objection of the Non-Insider Defendants to Motion to 12 Consolidate Related Adversary Proceedings and Enter an 13 Amended Scheduling Order (related document(s)76) filed by 14 Melissa Boey on behalf of the Sears Non-Insider Defendant 15 Group. (ECF #85) 16 17 HEARING re Adversary proceeding: 20-07007-rdd Sears Holdings Corporation et al v. Tisch et al Objection Notice of Joinder 18 19 in the Limited Objection of the Non-Insider Defendants to 20 the Motion to Consolidate the Related Adversary Proceedings, 21 and Enter an Amended Scheduling Order (related 22 document(s)85) filed by Daniel J. Guyder on behalf of HBOS 23 FINAL SALARY PENSION SCHEME. (ECF #86) 24 25

Page 7 1 HEARING re Adversary proceeding: 20-07007-rdd Sears Holdings 2 Corporation et al v. Tisch et al Objection Joinder to Limited Objection of the Non-Insider Defendants to the 3 4 Motion to Consolidate Related Adversary Proceedings and Enter an Amended Scheduling Order (related document(s)85) 5 6 filed by Bill Gussman on behalf of Andrew H Tisch, Daniel R 7 Tisch, Trustee of the Andrew H. Tisch (ECF #88) 8 9 HEARING re Adversary proceeding: 20-07007-rdd Sears Holdings 10 Corporation et al v. Tisch et al Objection /Joinder in 11 Limited Objection of Non-Insider Defendants to Motion to 12 Consolidate (related document(s)85) filed by Hugh M. McDonald on behalf of MUFG UNION BANK NA. (ECF #89) 13 14 15 HEARING re Adversary proceeding: 20-07007-rdd Sears Holdings 16 Corporation et al v. Tisch et al Objection /Joinder In 17 Limited Objection Of The Non-Insider Defendants To Motion To 18 Consolidate (related document(s)85) filed by Brian J. 19 Poronsky on behalf of GF TRADING LLC, HAP TRADING, LLC, RIEF 20 RMP LLC, RIEF Trading LLC.(ECF #90) 21 22 23 24 25

Page 8 1 HEARING re Adversary proceeding: 20-07007-rdd Sears Holdings 2 Corporation et al v. Tisch et al Objection to Motion Joinder and Limited Objection of the Horizon and Prescott Defendants 3 4 to Motion to Consolidate Related Adversary Proceedings and Enter an Amended Scheduling Order (related document(s)76) 5 6 filed by Robert Honeywell on behalf of HORIZON SPIN-OFF & 7 CORP. RESTRUCTURING FD., Kinetics Portfolio Trust, PRESCOTT 8 ASSOCIATES LP, PRESCOTT GENERAL PARTNERS LLC, PRESCOTT 9 INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS LP, PRESCOTT INVESTORS INC. 10 (ECF #91) 11 12 HEARING re Adversary proceeding: 20-07007-rdd Sears Holdings 13 Corporation et al v. Tisch et al Motion to Join Non-Insider 14 Defendants Motion to Consolidate Related Adversary 15 Proceedings and Enter an Amended Scheduling Order filed by 16 John B. Orenstein on behalf of AQR DELTA FUND, LP, AQR DELTA 17 MASTER ACCOUNT, L.P., AQR DELTA XN FUND, LP, AQR Delta Sapphire Fund, LP. (ECF #93) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Page 9 1 HEARING re Adversary proceeding: 20-07007-rdd Sears Holdings 2 Corporation et al v. Tisch et al Response to Motion /PLAINTIFFS OMNIBUS RESPONSE TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS (related 3 document(s)39, 62, 65, 48. 67, 60 69, 43, 64, 46, 61, 55) 4 5 filed by Joseph L. Steinfeld Jr. on behalf of Sears Holdings 6 Corporation, Sears, Roebuck and Co., The Official Committee 7 of Unsecured Creditors of Sears Holdings Corporation, et al. 8 (ECF #94) 9 10 HEARING re Adversary proceeding: 20-07007-rdd Sears Holdings 11 Corporation et al v. Tisch et al Reply to Motion /Plaintiffs 12 Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion to Consolidate 13 Related Adversary Proceedings and Enter an Amended 14 Scheduling Order (related document(s)76, 93) filed by Joseph 15 L. Steinfeld Jr. on behalf of Sears Holdings Corporation, 16 Sears, Roebuck and Co., The Official Committee of Unsecured 17 Creditors of Sears Holdings Corporation, et al. (ECF #95) 18 19 HEARING re Adversary proceeding: 19-08250-rdd Sears Holdings 20 Corporation et al v. Lampert et al Motion to Consolidate for 21 Trial/ NOTICE OF MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE RELATED ADVERSARY 22 PROCEEDINGS AND ENTER AN AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER filed by 23 David M. Zensky on behalf of Sears Holdings Corporation 24 (ECF #232) 25

Page 10 1 HEARING re Adversary proceeding: 19-08250-rdd Sears Holdings 2 Corporation et al v. Lampert et al Statement (related 3 document(s)232) filed by David M. Zensky on behalf of Big 4 Beaver of Florida Development, LLC, Innovel Solutions, Inc., 5 Kmart Corporation, Kmart Holding Corporation, Kmall Stores 6 of Illinois, LLC, Kmart of Washington, LLC, MaxServ, Inc., 7 SHC Desert Springs, LLC, STI Merchandising, Inc., Sears 8 Brands Business Unit Corp., Sears Brands, LLC, Sears 9 Development Co., Sears Holdings Corporation, Sears Holdings 10 Management Corp., Sears, Roebuck Acceptance Corp., Sears, 11 Roebuck and Co., Sears, Roebuck de Puerto Rico, Inc., The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Sears Holdings 12 13 Corporation, et al., acting on behalf of the Debtors' 14 Estates, Troy Coolidge No. 13, LLC. (ECF #233) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Transcribed by: Sonya Ledanski Hyde 25

	Page 11
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	Page 13
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11	JASON FOUNTAIN
12	CARLY EVERHARDT
13	PHILIP ANKER
14	ALIX BROZMAN
15	NOAH LEVINE
16	JACQUELINE MARCUS
17	BEN PAULL
18	CHRISTOPHER STAUBLE
19	DAVID ZENSKY
20	LEE J. ROHN
21	PHILLIP C. DUBLIN
22	JOSEPH SZYDLO
23	RICHARD REDING
24	THOMAS ROSS HOOPER
25	KARA CASTEEL

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		Page 14
1	JOSEPH STEINFELD	
2	SHANNON GROSS	
3	PAUL SCHWARTZBERG	
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5	NAKISHA DUNCAN	
6	MATTHEW GURGEL	
7	SIDNEY P. LEVINSON	
8	ERIC WEISGERBER	
9	DANIEL SHAMAH	
10	LAUREN WAGNER	
11	JULIA FROST-DAVIES	
12	PETER BUENGER	
13	ROBERT HONEYWELL	
14	JOHN MOLINO	
15	MELISSA BOEY	
16	ELLIOT MOSKOWITZ	
17	WAYNE KELLNER	
18	JOHN ORENSTEIN	
19	RANDALL ADAMS	
20	ROBERT ROSEN	
21	VICTOR OBASAJU	
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PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Good morning. This is Judge Drain.

We are here in In Re Sears Holding Corp., et al. for the

February omnibus hearing.

This is being conducted completely telephonically. You therefore should identify yourself and your client not only the first time you speak, but thereafter so that the court reporter and I can put together your voice with your name.

There is one authorized recording of today's calendar. It's taken by Court Solutions, which provides a copy and will do so today to our clerk's office. If you want a transcript of your hearing today, you should contact the clerk's office to arrange for the production of one.

Finally, because this is a completely telephonic calendar, you should keep your phone on mute unless of course you're speaking, at which point you need to unmute yourself.

So with that introduction, I have the amended agenda filed by the Debtors and I'm happy to go down that agenda in the order stated.

MR. FAIL: Thank you, Your Honor. Good morning.

For the record, Garrett Fail, Weil, Gotshal & Manges for the debtors. Are you able to hear me all right?

THE COURT: Yes, I can hear you fine, thanks.

MR. FAIL: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm glad you have the amended agenda filed late last night, at Docket 9310 for others following along. There are eight items on the agenda. The first seven are interim fee applications. In the past we've taken them collectively. I suggest that we do the same unless Your Honor has another preference. They include Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Prime Clerk, Akin Gump, FTI Consulting, Herrick Feinstein, Morritt, Hock and Hamroff, and Mr. Harner as the fee examiner. Those are the seven that are going forward this morning on an uncontested basis. THE COURT: Okay. MR. FAIL: I see a number of the professionals are on the line if you have any questions. THE COURT: I have questions only on three. why don't I begin to ask first whether there have been any developments on any of these applications, i.e. any changes to the amounts sought. MR. FAIL: We are not aware of any, Your Honor. And I have a proposed order subject to today's hearing that we could submit following the hearing. But that's the only reason we haven't submitted anything. THE COURT: Okay. And I just want to confirm, although I think it's clear from my review of his fee

application or his firm's fee application, Mr. Harner, you

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have reviewed each of these applications and they reflect your input?

MR. HARNER: Your Honor, we filed a, as we have periodically done with each interim fee application hearing, a status report that for some reason does not appear on this morning's agenda. So apologies if Your Honor did not see that. But we filed that a couple of weeks ago.

Among other things in that report, we indicated that we are largely complete, reviewing all of the fee applications through the fifth and the sixth reports will be submitted to the various professionals in short order. This order, as the prior orders -- this proposed order to which Mr. Fail refers, like the prior orders, does, however, put a reservation of rights for us to complete that work and likewise to continue our ongoing conversations with the professionals about issues we may have identified.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you recommend any holdback in light of that work, or are you content with the reservation and the right to get disgorgement if you conclude that an objection is warranted to any fee application that I would be considering today?

MR. HARNER: Your Honor, my response to that question is the same as when you have inquired at prior hearings when you have identified issues that need to be resolved and it may result in adjustments to fees that were

either applied for or previously approved on an interim basis by the Court. We remain satisfied that the ability and financial wherewithal of each of these firms to disgorge if necessary is sufficient at this point in the cases.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I said I had three questions, and why don't I just go through them. First, on the Weil Gotshal application, there is about 414 hours of time on real property leases, Section 365 issues, cure amounts. I'm really -- this is more curiosity than anything, although it may relate to the time spent. Is this work primarily with regard to leases that were neither rejected nor assigned to the buyer under the APA? I'm just confused how --

MR. FAIL: That is -- so I don't know that they're necessarily all leases, but it does related to the Debtor's additional sales of parcels, Your Honor. And if my partner, Jacqueline Marcus, wants to correct me, she can. I know I asked the question recently independently of this hearing. But there was additional -- there is still additional real estate work to wind down and to monetize additional parcels and assets. So it is not related to the Transform transaction, or it's not --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FAIL: It's certainly not exclusively or majority related to the Transform transaction from my

understanding.

MS. MARCUS: Your Honor, this is Jacqueline Marcus from Weil, just to supplement on behalf of the Debtors. The real estate area has been one of the ones which I have been primarily involved. And Mr. Fail is correct. Although our task code is 365 and assumption or rejection, we've really used that task code for all real-estate-related matters, and that includes the sales of various parcels as well as disputes that have arisen for the period of time when the Debtors were in possession. So I'll call it a little bit of a catchall for real estate related matters.

THE COURT: Okay. That's helpful. And then the amounts that the Debtors are looking to realize on these sales or the amounts that were at issue based on any claims that the other parties might have, are those well in excess of \$378,000?

MS. MARCUS: Yes, Your Honor. There have been actually several real estate dispositions that have been, you know, in the several hundred thousand range, some more than a million. So they are kind of odds and ends, but they have generated significant recoveries for the estate.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. All right. And then on the Herrick application, first I'll note that most of the time for this application is for the role of Herrick as conflicts counsel in the joint reasserted causes of action.

But a fair amount of time was also spent on the investigation of the so-called MTN transactions. And I really haven't heard much about that in the last really over a year, maybe more than over a year. Is that matter still ongoing?

MR. CARTY: Your Honor, this is Christopher Carty of Herrick Feinstein. Yes, that investigation is still ongoing, although we are getting towards the end of it.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CARTY: To be completed shortly.

THE COURT: All right. Okay, very well. And then lastly, the Akin Gump application has a very large number in the expense category for litigation-related expenses. I understand the expenses for the e-discovery firm and service and the like. I just want to make sure there is a mechanism in place -- and this really turns to Mr. Harner again -- for review of the work which is an expense item by the consulting firm hired by Akin. I don't know what -- it's really quite opaque as to what they're doing. I don't know if they are contract lawyers or what their role is. I don't think they're expert witnesses, although maybe I'm wrong about that. So maybe I should ask counsel from Akin Gump first as to what it is generally that that consulting firm has been doing. And then secondly of Mr. Harner as to whether there is a mechanism in place to review their work.

1 MS. BRAUNER: Sure. Good morning, Your Honor. 2 Sara Brauner, Akin Gump, on behalf of the Official 3 Committee. Can you hear me? THE COURT: Yes, I can hear you fine, thanks. 4 MS. BRAUNER: Excellent. So I would turn it over 5 6 actually to the extent Your Honor would like some additional 7 information about the specifics about that workstream to my 8 partners who are both on the line, David Zensky and Dean 9 But I can assure Your Honor that, yes, we are 10 working with the fee examiner to make sure that he has the 11 relevant information about all of the professionals being 12 retained. As Your Honor knows, because we are in this 13 interim period, we have a combination of the interim fee 14 protocols as well as the ability to retain professionals 15 under the confirmation order for purposes of the litigation 16 absent further approval of the Court. So we are working 17 closely with the fee examiner to ensure that he has the 18 relevant information he needs to do that analysis. 19 And I would turn it over to Mr. Chapman or Mr. 20 Zensky to give Your Honor some more detail on the specifics 21 of that engagement. 22 THE COURT: And again, I'm focusing on the Solomon 23 Page group category as opposed to the H5 category, which is 24 document management and e-discovery. 25 MS. BRAUNER: Understood.

THE COURT: Or the expert witness category. So it's really just the Solomon Page group. So, yes, if you can tell me what it is, that would be great.

MR. CHAPMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Dean Chapman of Akin Gump.

Solomon Page is our first-level document review contract attorney firm. So we did not at Akin Gump do any of the first-level document review. We turned that over to Solomon Page, which bills, you know, \$55 an hour or something in that level.

That work is now complete. At least it was complete as of November of December. I'm not sure where we are actually in submitting our invoices to the Court, but it is done from our perspective, and we'll work with the fee examiner of course to provide any additional information that would be helpful to explain the particular documents that were reviewed.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Does anyone have anything further to say on any of these fee applications? I should program just state for the record they're for Weil Gotshal, Prime Clerk, Akin Gump, FTI Consulting, Herrick Feinstein, and Morritt Hock and Hamroff as well as the seventh, which is Mr. Harner's application as fee examiner and Ballard Spahr as counsel's application.

MR. HARNER: Your Honor, it's Paul Harner as the

fee examiner. I just want to be responsive to your inquiry and to the colloquy about the contract attorneys that have been employed by Akin Gump. We actually have inquired and have had correspondence with Akin Gump, as Ms. Brauner indicates, about that topic. We recognize and have no quarrel with the use, as is ordinary and usual in these kinds of circumstances of contract attorneys to perform an additional level of document review or other discovery. And we are also aware of the provision in the confirmation order that provides the litigation trust with authority to retain without further court approval those kinds of contract lawyers.

The issue we have raised, however, is that the expense of that has been presented thus far both in monthly fee statements and in the interim fee applications as a single line item. And we have requested so that the fees themselves may be appropriately reviewed for reasonableness, additional detail, and time detail related to the services of those contract lawyers understanding that they can be retained without court authority, but that the approval of their fees and any related expenses remain subject to court review.

So we're working with Akin Gump on that issue, but I wanted to assure the Court that we're aware of it and have had a discussion with them about it.

THE COURT: Okay, all right. I think that's a reasonable request. I mean, I think obviously, as you say, this is, now that it's been described to me, a fairly typical expense incurred with respect to litigation that involves significant document review. On the other hand, I think anyone considering a bill that would contain this line item in it would want to know whether any particular attorneys were, for example, billing for 22 hours a day or the like, which just doesn't make sense and would lead to a reduction. So hopefully we are keeping time records and that information will be provided shortly.

All right, anyone else on the fee applications?
Okay.

I have reviewed each of the applications, and my questions about them have been satisfactorily answered on today's record. I believe that the work that has been done and the expenses incurred are reasonable for purposes of Section 331 of the Code.

The only issue in my mind after the questions on the individual applications were addressed is whether there should be any holdback at this point given the role of the fee examiner. But I'm satisfied by Mr. Harner's answer to that question and the reservation in the proposed order that his work and his ability to obtain any fruit from that work if it turns out that he concludes, and then ultimately I

Page 25 1 conclude that time for prior applications and these 2 applications should be disallowed and expenses disallowed is 3 sufficiently preserved, both as a legal and a practical matter. 4 5 So I'll grant each of the applications in the 6 amount sought on an interim basis, and the Debtor's counsel 7 can submit an order with the Schedules A and B attached 8 covering all seven of them. 9 MR. HARNER: With that, Your Honor, may Ms. Daluz 10 and I please be excused? 11 THE COURT: Yes. And anyone else who is on for 12 just those applications can also be excused. 13 MR. HARNER: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 MS. DALUZ: Thank you, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. FAIL: Thank you very much, Your Honor. 17 next item on the agenda I think is going to be handled by 18 Akin Gump. 19 THE COURT: Right. 20 MR. CHAPMAN: Good morning again, Your Honor. 21 Dean Chapman of Akin Gump. 22 I'm going to speak first on the consolidation 23 motion more generally, and then I will turn it over to Kara 24 Casteel of ASK who will address the specific arguments 25 raised in opposition by various public shareholder action

defendants who filed objections to the motion.

As I trust Your Honor is aware, the motion was filed jointly in both the first action, that is to say the insider action against Eddie Lampert and others that Akin Gump is prosecuting, as well as the second action, that is public shareholder action that ASK is prosecuting against non-insider shareholders for fraudulent transfer.

Prior to filing the motion, we sent a proposed order to defendants in both actions. And after some negotiation with the defendants in the first action, we were able to come to terms on a consensual order, and that is the order attached to the motion. As a result, none of the defendants in the insider or first action have filed any opposition to the motion or the proposed order.

There were also negotiations with defendants in the public shareholder action. Plaintiffs did offer some concessions to try to get to a consensual deal, but we were unsuccessful there. And as a result, now defendants have filed various objections. Defendants in the public shareholder have filed various objections.

By way of some quick background, Your Honor, which
I think is helpful just to level-set where we stand, Akin
Gump, as you know, took over prosecution of the adversary
proceeding in October of 2019 after the plan was confirmed.
And then a month later, November 2019, filed the amended

complaint, which remains the operative pleading in the action.

Around that same time, we also began exploring, at the direction of the litigation designees, the potential follow-on lawsuit against Sears' public shareholders. As the Court is likely aware, the first action asserts fraudulent transfer claims against Sears' controlling insider shareholders relating to the Lands' End spinoff and the Seritage rights offering. And those insiders owned about 75 percent of the stock of Sears Holdings at the relevant times. That's at least 25 percent of Sears Holdings, shareholders who received the Lands' End shares and the Seritage rights who would therefore also be liable as recipients of fraudulent transfers.

Our task, starting last November of 2019, was to take discovery pursuant to Rule 2004 to try and identify those public shareholders in the event that the litigation designees ultimately elected to file a lawsuit.

As you can imagine, it was a complex process to try and identify the shareholders. There were, you know, tens of millions of shares outstanding, and those shares were often held by financial institutions in street name on behalf of underlying beneficial owners. And of course it's those beneficial owners that we needed to ultimately identify.

Over the course of, you know, nine months or so,
Akin and our counsel at Morritt Hock served 127 subpoenas
aimed at identifying those public shareholders. And as we
all know now, the litigation designees opted to proceed with
the lawsuit against those Sears public shareholders or
groups of affiliated Sears public shareholders who would
receive the benefit of \$2 million or more from the Lands'
End or Seritage rights. And then ASK was retained to
actually handle drafting of the complaint, service of that
complaint, and prosecution of the action.

The motion before you is for consolidation of the two actions, the insider action filed by Akin and the public shareholder action filed by ASK. I won't belabor this point, but in our view, consolidation of the two actions is a no-brainer. The underlying fraudulent transfer claims are the same. They're intentionally-constructed fraudulent transfer claims relating to Lands' End and Seritage. The plaintiffs of the claim -- I'm sorry, the plaintiffs are the same, the claims are the same, the discovery will be the same, and the proofs at trial will be the same as well.

The only real difference between the two actions is the defendants named, and of course any individualized defenses those defendants might raise. But for the sake of judicial resources and estate resources and the need to avoid duplicative depositions and so forth, we think

consolidation makes a whole lot of sense in this case.

In addition to the consolidation, we've also submitted to the Court our proposed order which includes a schedule, a proposed schedule to govern discovery in the consolidated cases. As I mentioned at the outset, that schedule was fully negotiated with the insider action defendants in advance and reflects the deal stuck between us and them.

With respect to written discovery, it allows for written discovery to continue in the insider action, and then for written discovery to commence immediately upon entry in the public shareholder action.

As we note in the brief and as I think Your Honor is aware, extensive written discovery has already been obtained in the first action. We have millions of documents that we've obtained from defendants and third parties at considerable expense. And those documents are available to any of the public shareholder action defendants who want them immediately upon the execution by those defendants of a document-sharing stipulation that we have put together.

With respect to depositions, there are a variety of deadlines contained in the proposed schedule, but briefly, 28 days after Your Honor finished his ruling on the motions to dismiss in the insider action, the parties are to exchange lists of proposed deponents. A week later, they

are to conduct a scheduling logistics conference regarding depositions. And then 45 days after that scheduling conference, the actual deposition hearing may begin. So we're talking a total of 80 days between a decision on the motions to dismiss and potential commencement of depositions, fact depositions in the cases.

There aren't any other deadlines that have been fixed in the schedule. Instead, the parties are simply to conduct a second case scheduling conference 150 days after the first conference to discuss completing that discovery and then proceeding into expert discovery as well.

So I'll pause there for a minute. If Your Honor has any questions, great. But I think, you know, to state the obvious, we view the schedule as being fair and appropriate. You know, it's unlikely to result in depositions any time before the end of May, which we think is at this point a more than fair compromise by plaintiffs.

Again, I'll pause and also turn it over to Kara Casteel of ASK who can address some other things.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think maybe Ms. Casteel is the right one to answer this question. Under the proposed schedule, the schedule proposed by the plaintiff, document discovery in the second adversary would commence upon entry of the order. What is contemplated by the plaintiff in the second proceeding by way of document

discovery of the defendants?

MS. CASTEEL: Good morning, Your Honor. This is
Kara Casteel of ASK. And that's actually the question I
anticipated you to ask because I know that's the greatest
concern, at least what I can ascertain from the motions of
defendants.

Frankly, not a lot from the second action

defendants at the outset. I think what we're most concerned

with is the factual issues with Computershare Inc. and

Computershare N.A. My understanding is that there's already

been some discovery taken on Computershare for the Seritage

rights action or accounts as to what entities performed what

functions. And there is a clear, you know, stack issue here

as to Computershare. That's what we're most interested on.

Frankly, you know, part of the reason to consolidate is that the same proofs at trial, the same facts really relate to Sears' insolvency, badges of fraud of Sears. So I don't anticipate a lot of discovery on the second action defendants here other than maybe confirming they received the shares, you know, confirming the numbers are right. I don't anticipate taking any personal jurisdiction discovery until if and when any personal jurisdiction motions are filed, because frankly, that's a waste of estate resources to put the cart before the horse.

Pg 32 of 69 Page 32 1 maybe it was on us to perhaps clarify in our meet and 2 confers that we really are interested in getting discovery on Computershare going first, and we'll see where we go with 3 the second action defendants. But frankly, most f the 4 5 discovery has been done that we're interested in. 6 THE COURT: Okay. Now, obviously you've been 7 living with this, and I haven't. What role is Computershare 8 playing here? 9 There's -- Sears contracted MS. CASTEEL: Sure. with Computershare to perform the Lands' End dividend 10 11 duties. And part of the motions to dismiss involved wither or not Sears is a financial institution based on its 12 13 interactions with Computershare. And a large material fact 14 issue here is whether the duties performed were 15 Computershare Inc. or Computershare N.A. And that forms a 16 lot of our response as to why a motion to dismiss is 17 inappropriate at this time based on material fact issues as 18 to which entity was performing those functions. 19 THE COURT: All right. But Computershare -- is Computershare a defendant in action number two? 20 21 MS. CASTEEL: No, it is not, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: And you would be seeking discovery of 23 Computershare, not of the defendants then with respect to 24 those issues, those particular issues?

MS. CASTEEL: Correct, Your Honor. You know,

there might be some preliminary discovery. We haven't even thought out the timing of it because there's no -- there's no cutoff to discovery at this moment. So, you know, confirming that the share numbers are right and that they did in fact receive the shares is not something that has to be propounded immediately. There's no sense of urgency as much with that. Really what we want to focus on is getting out discovery to Computershare on the Lands' End transfers in the same respect that they've already gotten discovery in the first action as to the Seritage right transfers.

THE COURT: Okay. all right. So I just want to confirm -- I'm not sure which of you is the right one for this, whether it's you, Ms. Castell, or Mr. Chapman. Have you at this point reached agreement on the document release stipulation, document sharing stipulation, or is that still being negotiated?

MR. CHAPMAN: I think the answer is both of us.

This is Dean Chapman from Akin Gump.

The parties to the first action are signed (indiscernible) sharing stipulation. And with that, Kara, you can speak to the second action.

MS. CASTEEL: Yes. So the form has been presented to counsel in the second action. My understanding is there might be some non-substantive edits, as defendants sometimes like to do. But to date we haven't gotten back any proposed

revisions yet as to it. But plaintiffs stand ready to have them executed and get over the documents from the first action.

THE COURT: Okay. And then this is for Ms.

Casteel. The proposed order contemplates, it says in

Paragraph 4B, that, quote, "The Plaintiffs shall commence

the process of providing documents produced in the first

action following execution of the document sharing

stipulation." Is there a time limit on when that process

ends? Again, I'm focusing on the next date, which as you

say, is not a date to complete document discovery, but

rather to designate or exchange lists of proposed deponents,

which is 28 days after the Court decides the motion to

dismiss, or if this is later, March 15th.

So one of the objections I think correctly points out that this language, "Plaintiffs shall commence the process" is somewhat open-ended. And if you have to -- let's assume for example that I ruled on March 15th, the 28 days would start running then. It would be hard for them, conceivably they've argued, to even review if everything were provided right away within 28 days to notify you of any proposed witnesses. But it would be that much harder if in fact the documents weren't fully provided until say seven days until that 28-day deadline ran.

MS. CASTEEL: Understood, Your Honor. And I'll

take this chance to clarify the word commence. We've been working with the IT firm that Akin has employed regarding some of these documents. And my understanding -- and Mr. Chapman can clarify or provide a little insight. They stand ready to provide immediate transfer, file downloads, transfers, whatever is needed to get the documents in their hands. So the word commence is not intended to have some sort of rolling discovery process.

THE COURT: Okay. It would all happen at once?

MS. CASTEEL: Correct. And maybe Mr. Chapman can provide some insight on that. But my understanding are the documents are ready to go and it's just a matter of connecting the right people with the IT firm and defense counsel and getting them the documents they need.

THE COURT: Okay. And it's roughly 870,000 page?

MR. CHAPMAN: This is Dean Chapman at Akin Gump.

It's going to be more than that. There are -- let me look at my notes here. I would guess it's going to be around five million documents.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. CHAPMAN: And that is -- you know, the notion of commencement, again, was never meant to suggest we were going to delay or take time. It's in our interest to move as quickly as possible of course.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHAPMAN: But it's just because there are a lot of documents, it's difficult to say and we promise that within 48 hours it will be done. You know, to some extent we are bound by the time it takes for the technology to perform its function.

THE COURT: For how long have the defendants in the first action had access to those roughly five million documents?

MR. CHAPMAN: They've come in over time. They would have gotten -- at least the first say one-and-a-half million in January or so of 2020. The remainder would have come in all by say May, June, July, the summer time period.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. All right. So, Mr. Chapman, I think you were done and Ms. Casteel was going to address the objections in more detail.

MS. CASTEEL: Yes, Your Honor. I can speak to them.

Your Honor already brought up discovery. That was obviously one of the largest objections shared by most of the objectors, is that they didn't want discovery to start until the motion to dismiss in the second action had been decided. I can address that more, Your Honor, but I think perhaps the biggest objection was the thought that there would be some large-scale discovery on defendants.

Plaintiffs don't intend that. The main goal right now is to

get started on discovery against -- preponderant to the Computershare because that's the largest fact issue we have remaining for the Lands' End transfers because those counts weren't briefed in the first action in the motion to dismiss, so the discovery process as to the Lands' End shares didn't start yet.

The other objections, the three main objections were should the actions be consolidated at all while the motion to dismiss is pending. And if they are consolidated, how much, to what extent should they be consolidated.

As to the first objection, I think there's ample reasons to consolidate these notwithstanding outstanding motions to dismiss. There's no prejudice to the motions to dismiss if they're consolidated. Rather, they'll be dealt with. Either the motions to dismiss will be granted or the motions to dismiss will be denied and the case will move on. So consolidating them at this time doesn't really have an effect on the motion.

There is ample reason to consolidate the matters.

They involve the same underlying facts, they involve the same plaintiff, they involve the same proofs at trial. All the reasons that, you know, caselaw has suggested that discretion of the judge would warrant consolidating matters.

The other objection, the majority of defendants did agree that consolidation in some form should occur. But

the largest group of defendants in the second action, the non-insider defendants as they're called, they object to an order that consolidates it generally without carving out a reservation as to trial. And it's Plaintiff's position that the proposed order fully provides that the rights of any party to sever defendants, sever accounts for trial at a later date after discovery has been fleshed out if issues come to light in litigation that would warrant it. But it's our position that a piecemeal order now that reserves that isn't necessary. The same proofs needed for both are going to be at trial, the same witnesses that are deposed, the same expert witnesses are going to be the same ones that will be presented for trial. You know, even if not all of them are represented, even a small number are presented, really the efficiencies of consolidation for pretrial purposes warrant them for trial.

And again, no rights are waived here. There is a full right of any defendant to move at a later date to sever for trial. So it's our position that consolidation is warranted here of the case, it's warranted for the entire case, and that discovery should proceed apace. And there's plenty of time for the second action defendants to receive the documents in advance of any depositions to be had. You know, there's ample time after a decision is made on the motion to dismiss to provide lists and to start scheduling

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depositions. I think the dates are the later of March 15th or a decision on the order. Even if a decision came out March 15th, the earliest that depositions would occur is June 3rd based on the timing in the proposed order. And we're in February now. So given that there's defense groups working together and they can, you know, they can benefit from the work the first action counsel has already done having access to these documents, we don't think there's prejudice in commencing discovery upon entry of the scheduling order. THE COURT: Has there been discussion of a joint defense agreement to facilitate cooperation between the action two defendants and the action one defendants? MS. CASTEEL: Your Honor, I don't know that question myself. I'm not sure if any defense counsel on this call has any comments on that. MR. WILLETT: Good morning, Your Honor. This is Sabin Willett from Morgan Lewis. We represent a group of 80 non-insider defendant funds in the second case. And there have been preliminary discussions about that.

THE COURT: Okay. And I appreciate the word preliminary, and I know you're a careful lawyer. You're certainly free to say I can't answer that question now, but I'll ask it anyway. Have there been any insuperable obstacles to a joint defense agreement that would allow you

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to have strategy discussions with your opposite member or members in action one, like Mr. Anker or any of his colleagues at Debevoise, for example, and elsewhere?

MR. WILLETT: Your Honor, again, Sabin Willett. I don't think so. But the problem, if I can wade into it with a couple of toes, the problem is not a fear that our clients are going to get, you know, routine discovery requests about whether they received shares. The problem is the 5 million documents that you have to catch up to somehow. Even if you're cooperating with the --

THE COURT: No, I understand that. I'm focused on the five million documents, too. But it seems to me that the only real -- the most problematic issue here is the identification of proposed deponents, which is 28 days from the date of a ruling on the motions to dismiss in the first action. And it would seem to me the only way you could really be reasonably comfortable that that time would suffice is if you were able to sit down and really talk through with the first action defendants' counsel the process and thinking behind designating deponents. It would seem to me that your deponents would largely if not entirely overlap with theirs. But you'd have to obviously do your due diligence. And you couldn't deal with five million documents in that period of time, I don't think.

MR. WILLETT: Right, Your Honor. And I probably -

- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: And even if the clock started running tomorrow if I entered the order, that would only add, you know, a couple of weeks to that time. Anyway, so that's where I was going with that.

MR. WILLETT: Well, Your Honor, this --

THE COURT: I think if you have six months to prepare for a deposition and even longer of course to prepare for trial, that the five million documents would present much, much less of a problem. So I'm focused primarily on the harder deadline of identifying deposition witnesses.

MR. WILLETT: Right, Your Honor. I think the colloquy has illustrated that there's actually not that much difference between the parties. What we have essentially said is that we'd like this process that's outlined for case one to begin after you have ruled on all of the motions. Our hearing is March 12th. Many of the issues are the same. Some are not the same. But if we can, you know, start down a road after you have ruled, some or all of the outsiders may not have to start down that road at all. And we are in that unique corner of the forest where you can get sued in a situation where you lacked any agency and where all of the actions, all the relevant actions are undertaken by others. So some sympathy is warranted for the outsider defendant in

a situation like this.

If we were able to persuade you on all of the grounds for the motion, then none of them would have to proceed with this substantial expense. If we were able to persuade you on half, say Seritage and not Lands' End, or vice versa, then some of the outsiders would also not have to undertake expense. And so the --

THE COURT: So if I -- let me make sure I understand what you're saying, then. So the real issue is not with the deadlines in the proposed order so much as it is that it runs from the dismissal or not dismissal determination in respect to the first action motions to dismiss.

MR. WILLETT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But as long as those deadlines run from the determination of both sets of motions, then, particularly with some of the clarifications that we've gone through this morning, this doesn't represent much of a problem.

MR. WILLETT: I think we can -- yes, I think we can get on board if we're able to get past the hearing and have in front of us your ruling on the motions.

THE COURT: Okay. I guess the one area where I might disagree with you on that is the commencement of the document production. It really doesn't seem to me based on

Page 43 1 what I've heard from the plaintiff's counsel that they're 2 actually looking for any material document production from 3 your clients or any of the other defendants, but rather just 4 from the third party on the nature of the agency. 5 MR. WILLETT: Yes. May I speak to that, Your 6 Honor? 7 THE COURT: Okay. MR. WILLETT: And I probably should caution as 8 9 well, we don't represent all of the defendants. There are 10 others that --11 THE COURT: No, I understand. But all but one of 12 them have joined in your motion. So --13 MR. WILLETT: Right. 14 THE COURT: In your opposition I mean. 15 MR. WILLETT: So two points on that. First, I 16 don't think that the discovery of Computershare will be 17 relevant, but that's only what I think, and I know it's not 18 controlling. I don't think we'd have any objection to them 19 20 starting document discovery of Computershare with regard to 21 Lands' End, which I think is what they want to do. Or if 22 there's more on Seritage, we wouldn't object to that 23 starting now, either. 24 And I should comment that the delay on the 25 protective order -- as Your Honor may know, every

institution has its own house rules about discovery, protective orders, and various rings that must be kissed and folks in the office who have to be consulted. And so sort of wrangling a group this size -- I don't think that there are any major problems, but wrangling the group on, you know, what are the rules about document destruction after the fact and things like that is just taking a little time. THE COURT: All right. Okay. So it seems to me

the real issue is 4C of the order, which we've already talked about.

MR. WILLETT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: In particular, it's tracking off of a ruling on the motions to dismiss in the first action.

MR. WILLETT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, I know there is another objection as opposed to one in which people have joined, which is -which I haven't dealt with yet. So I thought I would give you an opportunity. But I think I interrupted counsel for the plaintiffs by going down this road, but I think it's been productive.

Let me throw something else out that may be productive. My ruling on the motions to dismiss in the first action obviously has been delayed. In part it was delayed because I got really busy towards the end of the summer and beginning of the fall. It also was delayed

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because, frankly, I wanted to see how the insurance litigation played out and in light of the stay order. I think the parties did, too. And then of course this lawsuit was started, i.e. the second action. And the motions to dismiss were filed in the second action, which are scheduled to be heard on March 12th.

It is highly likely to me that I will rule on both sets of motions to dismiss at the same time and that that ruling I trust will be before the end of March. So that may -- and obviously there's no reason why you all would know that, or even if you could guess that, wouldn't be sure of it. So that may affect people's thinking about this motion and the discovery elements of it. And I thought I would get that out on the table.

But why don't I go back to Ms. Casteel and ask if you have anything more to say. I think you do. I think I interrupted you on the timing points. But I expect you have more to say than that.

MS. CASTEEL: Your Honor, I frankly can't remember if you interrupted me or not, but I agree that that was something good to flesh out and talk about. Because as we were sitting here talking about it, we thought of one maybe proposed compromise here, which is that my understanding is counsel in the first action, they're ready to go, we've had the discovery, they're ready to go on depositions, and don't

want to unduly delay it after a decision on the motion to dismiss. That being said, we understand that there's a lot of documents for the second action defendants to go through notwithstanding the fact that certain joint defense agreements might cut down on some of that work.

So, you know, if perhaps they had 30 to 60 more days to propose additional deponents, that would solve the solution here if the second action defendants got some additional time. Because if the first action parties designate someone to be deposed, that really doesn't affect the second action. They can either agree and they can participate in the deposition or they can decide it's not relevant to them and not show up. There's not really prejudice by getting the process going. There's also not an end date to discovery under the scheduling order.

So if they need an additional 30 to 60 days to continue going through documents and they decide as they do that that there's more deponents that their depositions should be taken, perhaps that's a solution here that allows things to go forward and will also give them some more time to go through these documents.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Did you have anything more to say in response to the objections, or do you want to hear argument --

MS. CASTEEL: Your Honor, I guess I would just --

I want to make clear that we think it would be appropriate to have this timeline start from the decision in case one and the omnibus motion in case two and to not delay these matters any further by yet-to-be-filed personal jurisdiction motions, if any, that might be forthcoming in the cases.

The first matter has been outstanding for some time. The second one, while filed later, was the result of months of work. These transactions aren't getting any younger, and there's plenty of secured admin priority creditors that, you know, are relying on these forums to seek relief in the case, and we think it's appropriate to go forward as soon as we can.

on the yet-to-be-filed jurisdictional motions to dismiss, which is have the parties met and conferred as to the probable bases for those motions? I don't know if it's subject matter jurisdiction, for example, or personal jurisdiction, if it's just an issue that can be correct with proper service. Has there been any discussion as to what those grounds would be?

MS. CASTEEL: Your Honor, no. We really haven't gotten into it other than that, you know, the defendants wanted to move forward with common issues as to all defendants and reserve boutique issues as to their defendants for a later date and time to conserve resources

Pq 48 of 69 Page 48 1 is my understanding. So we haven't gotten into specific 2 arguments such as this defendant hasn't been properly served, this defendant -- you know, the only one we've 3 briefly touched upon is one defendant that has some 4 5 sovereign immunity issues that is probably one that comes to 6 mind. But I haven't gotten into the weeds with any 7 defendants on their specific claims. 8 THE COURT: Okay. Just one thing I was going to 9 raise with you, although both sides seem to want to put off 10 the issue of personal jurisdiction, is whether it would make 11 sense to have that meet and confer and to take, if it's 12 warranted, limited discovery on the jurisdictional issues 13 with respect to those parties that would conceivably raise 14 So that if, for example, a schedule was going to be them. 15 moving forward, it wouldn't be further delayed by a 16 subsequent post motion process of taking discovery just on 17 jurisdictional issues. MR. WILLETT: Your Honor, Sabin Willett. May I 18 respond? 19 20 MS. CASTEEL: Sure. 21 THE COURT: Okay.

> MR. WILLETT: This one you may recall we actually requested a departure from the usual Rule 12 rule not to have to bring these bespoke motions, and they typically are personal jurisdiction or sovereign immunity now, in part

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because they might become mooted if we were successful on the global motion, and in part because they tend to prolong things indefinitely. So we didn't think that we could then turn around and say, but the whole case needs to wait while those things get resolved.

So at least our group -- and I don't speak for every defendant -- but our group has not asked for any delay in the case as a consequence of the -- and we do have some clients who do have potential personal defenses like that.

THE COURT: Okay. But I think here -- and this is

I think the main difference between your objection and the

objection by HSBC Bermuda. So maybe I should hear from

their counsel as well as Ms. Casteel on the point I've

raised.

MR. KARAVOLAS: Yes, Your Honor. Nicholas

Karavolas, Phillips Lytle, for HSBC Bank Bermuda. And I was

actually just going to chime in. So thank you, Your Honor.

We did have an initial discussion with Ms. Casteel yesterday. I don't want to go into the details because it was partially, you know, a settlement discussion. But we did highlight that in addition to service issues, our client does assert that there is a personal jurisdiction issue as well to be dealt with.

We were not part of the stipulation that was -- we were not a party to stipulation that was entered in late

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December, and we thought that it made sense to ensure that we were kind of narrowing the issues with counsel as far as what our concerns are. And there are other concerns, both substantive and procedural, but we wanted to make sure that those -- we had an initial discussion regarding those concerns of our client.

And so I understand that there is still some information being discovered through the holder of the Seritage rights. Obviously my client is impacted -- they're being sued only in connection with the Seritage rights transaction. But there are some issues regarding identity of the accountholder. I understand from Plaintiff's counsel that they're still in the process of obtaining that information. And I appreciate that, you know, they're kind of tied to whatever information they're provided. But in the same instance, it seems as if at the end of the day when the dust settles, we'll reach the conclusion that my client wasn't, you know, the appropriate party to be sued here.

And, you know, our biggest concern really -- and I might as well kind of go into a little bit on, you know, what our objection is about. But I think that the consolidation and the discovery issues are interrelated. I don't think it was a coincidence that these issues were brought to the forefront in the same motion. I don't necessarily have -- you know, I don't think we necessarily

have any issue with consolidation of the actions, and we understand the efficiencies to be served by bringing them together. But there is prejudice that comes with that. And it's clear from the proposed scheduling order that there would be prejudice, especially to those parties that we think would be asserting personal jurisdiction defenses in this action. To the extent that, you know, these are parties that are not even subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, that these -- you know, to engage in full-blown discovery, you know, just to determine at some later point that they're, you know, not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court is unduly burdensome. And it seems fundamentally unfair to move in the procedure that, you know, the plaintiffs have proposed. So we filed a separate --

THE COURT: Well, let me push back on that. Can I push back on that? I mean, I appreciate that one can raise certain jurisdictional issues at any point in the case, including on appeal. But at the same time, it strikes me as odd that one could say I'm going to raise it, and just by saying it without actually doing it obtain a stay of all discovery in the adversary proceeding. That just doesn't -- I mean, that -- maybe it doesn't rise to the level of supersecret double probation, but it kind of does. I mean, I think the caselaw deals with actual motions that have been filed that are pending before a court where there's an

assertion of lack of jurisdiction and therefore a request to stay discovery or opposition to discovery on that grounds.

But here, I think there's got to be some balance between saying that you might have a basis to object to the continuation of a lawsuit and for dismissal of it based on jurisdictional grounds, and therefore just by saying it precluding discovery.

So I guess I'm more in the camp of Mr. Willett on this that, you know, those motions would have to be dealt with, but it's kind of up to the movant to get them on so that they don't have to spend more money on discovery, which I think at this point we've pretty much narrowed down to not discovery being taken of the movant -- I'm sorry, taken of your client, but rather getting prepared for actions that need to be taken at the earliest sometime this summer.

MR. KARAVOLAS: I understand, Your Honor.

Nicholas Karavolas for HSBC Bank Bermuda. And I would just,
you know, highlight that the request for the scheduling
order does not -- I appreciate counsel's comments on the
record regarding what discovery is anticipated in this
action, and I think that if that's the understanding, that's
a fair understanding.

However, I think it should be -- you know, there's no real restriction on the taking of discovery in the proposed order. And once the cat's out of the bag, you

know, there's no way to really curtail that other than to seek court intervention at some point later on. But I do appreciate the -- you know, I think it is helpful that counsel did make the comment of what type of written discovery would be anticipated in this case.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Does anyone -- I appreciate there are a lot of people on the phone. You all should appreciate -- I haven't said it, but I have read the pleadings on this, so there's no need to repeat the pleadings. But does anyone have anything more to say on this motion or the objections?

MS. CASTEEL: Your Honor, this is Kara --

THE COURT: Go ahead, Ms. Casteel.

MS. CASTEEL: Your Honor, Kara Casteel for ASK. I just wanted to point out that the parties, the second action parties entered a stipulated scheduling order. And I appreciate HSBC didn't sign it, but we're honoring it as to them, too. Because obviously they preserved their personal jurisdiction defense, if any. So we are allowing them to be under the stipulation. We wouldn't assert they couldn't object. But it provides that any of these other defenses have to be -- that the motions need to be filed within 30 days after the court rules on the omnibus motion.

I know you had brought up whether or not it made sense to take some limited discovery as to personal

jurisdiction. In terms of timing, we certainly don't look to initiate it right away. I would say that perhaps it would make sense after ruling on the omnibus motion if this matter proceeds forward and there are parties intending on filing personal jurisdiction motions, it might make sense for the parties to work together to extend that schedule maybe 30 days to take some limited discovery and allow them some time to file their motions after that discovery in terms of timing. But prior to a decision on the omnibus motion, we're not looking to do any discovery on those issues.

THE COURT: Okay. I think, Mr. Willett, you were going to say something?

MR. WILLETT: Yes, Your Honor. Just two more points from us this morning. First, we haven't touched on the consolidation for trial issue. And I think the dispute between the parties is whether to do it now with an unwind later or to just -- as Ms. Casteel suggests, or to just wait and see how the world looks after you have ruled and whatever discovery is going to happen as had we started to proceed. I just can't quite understand what jumping the gun now does for anyone. There won't be any prejudice to addressing this later. Our opponents may well be correct, but we just don't know yet. So that's the first thing.

The second was I think that if Your Honor sort of

Pg 55 of 69 Page 55 1 lays down the principle that the triggering event for the 2 review and deposition setup period would be ruling on both motions, we could probably go back to our offices and come 3 4 up with a consensual order. 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. WILLETT: At least speaking from the 7 perspective of my group. Thank you, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Okay, that's helpful. Thank you. All 9 right. 10 Well, as a practical matter, that's what's going 11 to happen. I find it hard to believe that I wouldn't rule 12 on one without at the same time ruling on the other set of motions to dismiss. 13 14 Let me -- I reviewed the order carefully, the 15 proposed order, and I did want to discuss with you, since it 16 may well be that the parties do go back and work out a 17 consensual order, there are a couple of points I wanted to 18 discuss with you. 19 Obviously the lawyers working on this matter, 20 which includes the lawyers for the defendants in the first 21 action, are very capable and very experienced. And they've 22 worked out the terms of this order. So I don't want to be mucking up the works. But I do want to point out my 23

concerns about the following points.

Paragraph 4C states in the second sentence, "The

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parties shall conduct one or more meet-and-confers regarding fact depositions." And then it's the defined term, "The deposition scheduling conference" regarding, among other things, the identify of deponents, the logistics, the length, conducted remotely if necessary, preliminary schedule, no later than the date that is one week, seven days, after the exchange date.

And I guess the issue I have there is how do you know when that conference is done since it's more than one, since D and E of Paragraph 4 trigger off of the conference, the defined term. I just think you need to have some mechanism to trigger D and E. It could be that outside date, i.e. seven days after the exchange date. But it's probably a fairly minor point since it's only seven days, but it doesn't quite fit in to D and E.

And I think you need to also provide for the scheduling, just so you have it there, of at least one more pretrial conference rather than the open-ended without any court involvement in this. I think F kind of does that, because it refers to a case scheduling conference which is not with the court. But then it says, "and report back to the Court", which doesn't really contemplate an additional conference.

So I think you ought to consider at least tentatively scheduling a conference, even if it's not

necessarily the conference that must occur after you're done with discovery. And you can provide that the parties can adjourn that conference on consent if they've not completed discovery.

And I guess to deal with Mr. Willett's point about why consolidate now, I think it may make sense to have that discovery -- I'm sorry, that pretrial conference include as subject matter the issues to be considered at trial and their order of consideration, and finally, whether there should be any deconsolidation at that point just so that there is a forum for a discussion on those issues before people get deep into preparing for a trial.

so I would recommend that you work into this order at least one formal pretrial conference with the Court for two reasons. One is basically at least a reality check in this order as to when people think now, today, discovery will be done and people can focus on the trial. And two, a date where some defendant can say, you know, now that we're here, we think that the trial should be deconsolidated for whatever reason.

And then I think you probably should clarify 4B as to, you know, the -- the only process in 4B for releasing the documents is a logistical process in getting it to the right person on behalf of the defendant in each case. And probably some statement to the effect that any discovery

sought by the plaintiffs of the second action defendants will be consistent with the representations made at the hearing on the motion or materially consistent with it pending the Court's determination of the motion to dismiss in the second action.

And then I think it is a good idea to have a second date for designating witnesses -- I'm sorry, deponents for the second action defendants. Although since I believe both as a legal and practical matter it makes sense to have C track off of a decision on the motions to dismiss in both actions, that it doesn't need to be materially longer than the 28 days. You know, I would say maybe another 30 days and -- unless the parties want to agree on a somewhat longer period for the second action defendants.

So those are my comments on the order. I'm going to give you my ruling and then people can come back to me if any of those comments just doesn't make sense to them and they want to persuade me or the other parties that we shouldn't address it that way.

The motion really seeks two forms of relief, and they are clearly related. First, the motion by the plaintiffs in both adversary proceedings, i.e. Sears Holding Corp. et al. v. Edward Scott Lampert, et al. and Sears Holding Corp., et al. v. (indiscernible) Tisch, et al.

Mainly, the motion seeks that those two adversary proceedings be consolidated for purposes of Bankruptcy Rule 7042, which incorporates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 which in 42(a) provides for the consolidation of actions involving a common question of law or fact.

The second relief that the motion seeks is entry of an order that not only consolidates the actions, but provides for a timetable for discovery in the action. The motion has been objected to in part by a majority of the defendants in action number two, that is the Tisch proceeding. It has not been objected to by the parties, the defendants in action number one, the Lampert, et al. adversary proceeding.

The objections, particularly the limited objections, focus really at this point exclusively on the timing aspect of the relief sought here with respect to discovery, and more specifically as to the motion's request that the parties shall exchange lists of proposed deponents by the later of 28 days from the date the court issues an order deciding the last of the motions to dismiss in the first action, i.e. the Lampert action, and March 15, 2021, the exchange date. And then other timing provisions for discovery track off of that exchange date.

The parties who either filed or joined in the limited objections contend that given the pendency of the

motions to dismiss in the second action, which are scheduled for oral argument on March 12th, the exchange date should track off of the later of the determination of the motions to dismiss in the first and the second action.

The other objection, which is by HSBC Bank, Bermuda branch, makes a second point, which is that it may have a separate grounds for dismissal than the motion that I'm going to hear on March 12th on jurisdictional grounds. The plaintiffs have agreed previously that such a motion, i.e. on jurisdictional grounds, can be made at a later time and instead that that would apply to HSBC Bank Bermuda even though it was not a party to that stipulated order. HSBC argues therefore that since it's not yet filed, motion to dismiss might moot out the entire adversarial proceeding as to if I should not enter any discovery order that would implicate it with having either to provide discovery or review the voluminous discovery that Paragraph 4B of the proposed order contemplates being released upon entry of the order by the plaintiff from the discovery taken in the first action.

The standard for evaluating a motion to consolidate under Rule 42(a) is not disputed by the parties. It's laid out by the Second Circuit in Johnson v. Celotex Corp, 899 F.2d 1281, 1285 (2d Cir. 1990), which states that in the exercise of the court's discretion in determining

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whether actions should be consolidated in whole or in part, the court needs to consider, quote, "Whether the specific risks of prejudice and possible confusion are overborne by the risk of inconsistent adjudications of common factual and legal issues, but burden on parties' witnesses and available judicial resources posed by multiple lawsuits, the length of time required to conclude multiple suits as against a single one, and the relative expense to all concerned of the single trial, multiple trial alternatives." See also In Re MF Global Holdings Ltd., 464 B.R. 619, 623, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).

Here, it is clear that with respect to two of the transactions at issue in the first action, the same facts as to the transactions are the subject matter of the second action. And therefore, with regard to requests to consolidate the two actions, it appears clear to me, and I believe also even clearer to the objectors, that the presence of those common, factual, and to a very large extent legal issues argue strongly for consolidation of the two actions, starting with the discovery phase and subject to a lookback after discovery is fully complete through trial for the convenience of all parties and the orderly determination of the underlying issues without risk of inconsistent rulings and duplication of depositions and other discovery and trial presentations.

I believe with a sufficient forum in the form of an already-scheduled, i.e. to be scheduled in the order, post-discovery pretrial conference consolidating the matters, the adversary proceedings, now is warranted under the facts considered by courts in this circuit.

The real issue, again, is the timing issue. The courts are clear that while one of the grounds for the Supreme Court's adoption of the plausibility approach to motions to dismiss is to curtail expensive and lengthy discovery while not warranted by the face of the complaint.

The filing of a motion to dismiss does not per se lead to the stay of discovery. Courts have recognized an exception where the motion to dismiss is premised upon a jurisdictional grounds, which would clearly moot out the relief sought, limiting discovery under those circumstances to discovery as to the jurisdictional arguments raised in the motion to dismiss to the extent they are fact-based. But even there, the courts have been careful to say notwithstanding dicta in Filus v. Lot Polish Airlines, which was a sovereign immunity case ultimately, 907 F.2d 1328, 1332 (2d. Cir. 1990) that, quote, "A motion to dismiss does not ultimately stay discovery except in cases covered by the Private Securities Litigation Act. Best discovery should not be routinely stayed simply on the basis that a motion to dismiss has been filed. However, upon a showing of good

cause, a district court has considerable discretion to stay discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and in some circumstances a pending motion to dismiss may constitute good cause for a protective order staying discovery. A court determining whether to grant the stay of discovery pending a motion must look to the particular circumstances and posture of each case. Courts consider, one, the breadth of discovery sought, any prejudice that would result, and three, the strength of the motion."

The O'Sullivan v. Deutsche Bank AG, 2018 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 70418 *13-14 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 26, 2018) and the cases cited therein, see also Judge Engelmayer's decision in Campanelli v. Flagstar Bancorp Inc. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211740 *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2019), and Magistrate Judge Wang's decision in Medina v. City of New York, 2020 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 100456 *5-8 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 8, 2020).

Here, I believe that the order as I suggested it be revised sufficiently protects the prejudice that might result to the second action defendants by the discovery timetable that was initially proposed and that further delaying discovery until a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds is ultimately filed, if ever, would unduly prejudice the other parties to the adversary proceeding and is not warranted.

As a practical matter, again, I've noted that it's

highly likely that I will rule on the motions to dismiss
that are pending in the second action at the same time that
I rule on the motions to dismiss that were previously argued
and are sub judice in the first action.

So as a practical matter, the proposal in Paragraph 4C would cover -- or the exchange date would trigger off of a ruling in both actions, and there's no reason not to provide for that now in the order so that there is no doubt about that.

And as I've noted during oral argument, I think the other changes to the order conceivably protect the objecting defendants in action number two from any undue prejudice in discovery. That would take place before a ruling on those two sets of motions to dismiss and with respect to preparing for compliance with the deadlines that are triggered off of the exchange date.

So subject to hearing from anyone if they think that the proposed changes just simply don't make sense, that's my ruling on this motion.

MR. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, this is Dean Chapman from Akin Gump. Two quick observations. First, I just wanted to express our gratitude to the Court for giving us some indication on where things stand with the motions to dismiss. It certainly helps resolve some uncertainty around that.

Second, Your Honor, with respect to Section 4C, you had raised a question about the fact that there is a reference to one or more meet and confers, the defined term deposition scheduling conference, you know, it might be confusing. We'll obviously go back and address this. But so the record is clear, plaintiff's position is that whether or not the deposition scheduling conference is one meet and confer or two meet and confers or whatever, all of those meet and confers take place within seven days after the exchange date in Section 4C.

THE COURT: Right, okay. (indiscernible) them.

You say that they'll have that conference. And in any
event, the things in D and E occur -- they run off of seven
days after the exchange date.

MR. CHAPMAN: That makes sense.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? All right.

So as far as the pretrial conference that I'd like you to build into this order, I want to be clear, that is there as a holding date. If the parties have good reason, either together or someone can persuade me over other parties' objection to move that conference, I am certainly prepared to do that. But I just think we need to have a marker there so that parties really see some date that the Court will hear as opposed to just getting an email report that's also filed of where the parties are after their case

scheduling conferences.

It's fine to have those case scheduling conferences, don't get me wrong. I want you to have those so that when you have the pretrial conference, you can say all right, we're done, we have all these issues resolved, this is how we want the trial to proceed. Or alternatively, this is how most of us want to proceed, but the following issues have arisen and there's a forum so the parties can raise those issues in front of me.

So hopefully I'll have an order that's agreed on this. If it's not agreed, I'd like you to just submit the order and let me know if someone has said that they want to submit a proposed counterorder, which they should submit no more than a couple of days after the order is emailed to chambers if that -- you know, if that's (indiscernible) at that point. So I don't want to have another hearing on this, just (indiscernible) on the proposed order -- orders if someone can't agree to the actual form of order.

Any other questions, or does anyone have anything more to say? Okay.

Thank you all. So I will look for that order, hopefully (indiscernible).

That concludes today's calendar, I believe. I think all the other matters on the calendar, Mr. Fail, were -- I'm not sure he's on. Ms. Marcus -- Mr. Fail is -- all

	Page 67				
1	the other matters on the calendar were adjourned, correct?				
2	MR. FAIL: That's correct, Your Honor. I was just				
3	trying to unmute.				
4	THE COURT: Okay, very well. So I will hang up at				
5	this point. Thank you all.				
6	(Whereupon these proceedings were concluded)				
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Page 69 1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 I, Sonya Ledanski Hyde, certified that the foregoing 4 transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. 5 Sonya M. dedarki Hyd 6 7 8 Sonya Ledanski Hyde 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Veritext Legal Solutions 20 21 330 Old Country Road 22 Suite 300 Mineola, NY 11501 23 24 25 Date: February 24, 2021